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Abstract
Whenever we want to avoid failures or hazardous events in today’s complex technological systems, it is advisable to carry
out appropriate risk management. One of the most important aspects of risk management is the risk analysis process.
The aim of this paper is to show a new risk analysis method based on the Uniﬁed Modelling Language (UML), which is
successfully used in software engineering for describing the problem domain. The paper also includes a small practical
example. It also shows a new risk analysis method based on an example of an unreeling process in cable manufacturing.
Keywords: risk analysis, Uniﬁed Modelling Language, manufacturing systems.
1 Introduction
Risk analysis and risk control have been very fre-
quently used words in recent years. It seems to
be a modern trend to speak about risk, mainly in
economics or in management of the environment.
However if we focus on our everyday lives, we will
ﬁnd that there are many situations when we subcon-
sciously make a risk analysis.
We do not usually recognise particular phases
of our intuitive risk analysis, and we cannot apply
this biological process directly in technical applica-
tions. The reason is very simple: we might omit
some important factors during our intuitive risk anal-
ysis which can lead to fatal consequences. Present-
day technologies are complex systems, and they work
with various materials and utilise demanding pro-
cesses. During the life-cycle of these technologies,
hazardous events or failures can occur. So we try to
ﬁnd ways to prevent all potential damage. For this
we need risk analysis.
The paper focuses primarily on risk analysis for
technological systems. Our aim is to present a new
application of standard software modelling tools to
improve and enrich computer processing, and to sim-
plify the steps in risk analysis. The paper therefore
provides a new interdisciplinary view of the risk anal-
ysis issue, as will be discussed below.
2 Risk analysis process
As mentioned above, each of us applies risk analy-
sis several times per day. We do this process fully
automatically (subconsciously). We usually do not
think about it in greater detail. For example, as we
leave home, we try to remember if all electric, gas
and water devices have been switched oﬀ or closed,
including the kitchen stove and the water taps. A
similar example is when we prepare for our holiday:
we think about possible hazards and we try to avoid
them or at least to be well prepared. It is obvious
that the same sort of thinking is applicable in tech-
nical branches. Let us take a look at three common
characteristic questions, mentioned by Tichy´ in [1]:
1. What failures can occur in the inspected object
or process?
2. How often can these failures arise?
3. What will happen after the failure occurs?
These questions are universal enough, and can be
applied to every human activity. However, for real
usage, especially in technical applications, it is nec-
essary to specify concrete steps with speciﬁc rules.
It is recommended to follow the general risk analysis
process for technological systems deﬁned in the IEC
300-3-9 standard [2]. In particular, it is necessary to
take the following steps:
1. deﬁne the scope of the analysis,
2. identify the hazard and make an initial evalua-
tion of the consequences,
3. estimate the risk,
4. verify,
5. make documentation,
6. update the analysis.
As might be expected, each step can be subdivided
into more detailed tasks. Although these steps may
appear simple and easy, it is often quite diﬃcult to
implement them.
3 Risk analysis techniques
In the course of history, many techniques have been
developed for making a risk analysis, especially in
the last hundred years. It is necessary to recognise
that this is an ongoing process. We can observe the
progress in risk analysis techniques in response to
rapid technical advances. Some modern techniques
are derived from older methods, which have been
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Table 1: The most widely used risk analysis methods
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Event Tree Analysis (ETA) no no yes bottom-up
Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) no no yes bottom-up
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) yes yes yes top-down
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) yes yes no bottom-up
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) yes yes yes bottom-up
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) no no yes top-down
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) yes yes no bottom-up
suitably modiﬁed and enriched to fulﬁl current needs
and make use of new possibilities. However, risk anal-
ysis techniques have originated in various ﬁelds of
activity and in various historical eras (in the scope
of technical and technological invention), but all of
them use the rules of systematic analysis and logic.
We can see the application of two main logical prin-
ciples: induction and deduction. Induction is used
when we investigate possible consequences of haz-
ardous events. On the other hand, deduction is ap-
plied to ﬁnd out possible causes of hazards or failure
modes. In terms of risk analysis, these principles are
called bottom-up for induction, and top-down for de-
duction. Of course there are ways to combine these
two principles, but we can also apply them separately.
In addition, risk analysis methods can be divided
from another point of view, as can be seen in [4].
The qualitative or quantitative character (or
both) of each method will now be discussed. This
distinction is based on whether the method provides
numerical results. Another aspect of risk analysis
methods is the output format. This issue is often de-
termined by the principles that are applied, the struc-
ture of the system (or process), and by the accom-
panying eﬀort to achieve clear visualisation. Thus
we can ﬁnd verbal, tabular or graphical outputs.
For a complex technological system with many parts
spread over a wide area, it can be a very hard task
to describe this system in purely textual form, and it
may be better to choose a suitable graphical repre-
sentation. The most widely used risk analysis meth-
ods are presented in Table 1, which has been taken
from [4, 2] and reduced.
All methods mentioned here strictly use logi-
cal principles. However, let us focus on an alter-
native way of making an analysis, which is widely
used in other technical branches: software develop-
ment.
4 Object-oriented principles
At the beginning of each software project, it is neces-
sary to make several analytical steps. In these steps,
software developers attempt to identify and describe
all desirable entities, their relationships and their be-
haviour. Here we can clearly see a basic similarity
with the risk analysis process: the initial steps are
the same — see section 2.
During the last three decades, object-oriented ap-
proaches have often been used for these purposes.
Object-oriented approaches are based on the idea
that the world consists of objects which interact with
each other. Objects are characterised by the follow-
ing features:
• encapsulation
• inheritance
• polymorphism
The term “encapsulation” indicates that the at-
tributes and functions of the entity are joined to-
gether into one speciﬁc object. Attributes describe
the state of the object, and functions can change the
state and behaviour of the object. Inheritance re-
ﬂects the everyday reality of the evolution of objects.
It allows a new object to be derived from one or more
parent objects, and during inheritance some new fea-
tures can also be appended. Polymorphism shows
the behaviour which diﬀerent object types have in
common.
The idea of object-oriented approaches also in-
volves structural aspects, so we can consider basic
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relationships, such as aggregation, association and
composition.
Interaction between objects is provided by send-
ing messages. The source object sends a request for
some function on the target object. The target will
react to the incoming event in accordance with its
state and conditions.
The same principle has been unconsciously ap-
plied in technically-oriented risk analysis for a long
time. We may inspect an object (e.g. a manufactur-
ing system, an engine, a component) in a view of its
properties, functions and interconnections with other
objects. In general, we can observe speciﬁc hazards
assigned to a speciﬁc object. Therefore we can say
that these hazards are encapsulated in the object.
Our experience with similar objects gives us a guide-
line for estimating the potential hazard, so we work
with inheritance. Polymorphism in risk analysis can
be seen in the following way: the same hazard can be
caused by several diﬀerent objects.
The Uniﬁed Modelling Language was developed
for graphical visualisation of previous concepts, and
also ﬁts well for several other purposes.
5 UML modelling tools
Uniﬁed Modelling Language is a speciﬁc set of tools
which can help in several ﬁelds of activity, not only
in software engineering. It uses the object-oriented
approach mentioned above and adds some comple-
mentary tools for a better description of the struc-
ture and behaviour of the system. We demonstrate
that all these features can be utilised in several stages
of risk management, mainly during a description of
the system (or process) and also in visual hazard sce-
nario modelling. Although UML is a very complex
language, let us take a brief look into its composition.
The language includes the following basic construc-
tion blocks [3]:
• subjects
• relationships
• diagrams
Subjects (or abstractions) can be further subdivided
to:
• structural abstractions — nouns e.g. classes, in-
terfaces, collaboration, use cases, etc.
• behaviour — modal verbs, e.g. interaction,
state;
• aggregations — packages for grouping signiﬁ-
cantly related components;
• comments — additional useful annotations ex-
tending the model.
Diagrams are a graphical representation of the model.
There are symbols with predeﬁned syntax and se-
mantics to show the model in several views. Obvi-
ously, diagrams allow better orientation in a descrip-
tion of the system, especially when several people are
participating in the project. In this case, diagrams
are an unambiguous form of description used in team
cooperation, and they are often more eﬀective than
huge paragraphs of text. An important diﬀerence be-
tween models and diagrams is that when we remove
a symbol from a diagram, it does not mean that the
corresponding parts in the model are automatically
discarded.
All descriptions, recommendations and simple ex-
amples can be found in the UML speciﬁcation [9]. We
can also see an interesting UML feature: the meta-
model approach. This means that a language deﬁni-
tion can be described by its own means.
6 Risk analysis based on
UML
In this part of our paper we discuss the use of UML
as a helpful tool for risk assessment. We have tried
above to brieﬂy describe the basic principles of the
risk analysis process and an object-oriented approach
used in software application design. Although there
are many similarities between these diﬀerent pro-
cesses (both are usually organised as a project [6]),
it is not easy to apply the steps used in software de-
sign to a risk analysis. UML does not provide rec-
ommended methodologies for using its own tools and
the sequence in which to make the UML parts. Sev-
eral methodologies have been developed in software
engineering that aim to describe the right order, for
example RUP (Rational Uniﬁed Process), see [7]. We
can also take some inspiration from these methodolo-
gies, but the diﬀerences in our domain should not be
forgotten. Let us note that the RUP methodology
also includes some steps related to risk assessment.
An important consideration is that the whole pro-
cess of risk analysis cannot be ﬁnished at once and
cannot be done quickly. If we want to obtain ap-
propriate and valuable results, we have to iterate as
many times as necessary. We would now like to pro-
pose a new UML-based method for risk assessment.
This new method consists of the following steps:
1. describe the system structure by Class diagram
or Component diagram,
2. describe the behaviour by Activity, Sequence or
State diagrams,
3. identify, qualify and add potential hazards into
Class diagrams,
4. create rough hazard scenarios by Use Case dia-
grams,
5. describe detailed risk scenarios with the use of
Interaction or Activity diagrams,
6. evaluate the results and the documentation.
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Fig. 1: NFA2X cable core processing line
7 Practical example
Let us take a look at a small practical example from
electro-technical manufacturing. We will be investi-
gating possible risks in a processing line that pro-
duces NFA2X cable core. This is an aluminium
twisted wire core with XLPE (cross-linked polyethy-
lene) insulation. A simple scheme of the processing
line topology is shown in Fig. 1, sketching its real
conﬁguration at PRAKAB Prazˇska´ kabelovna, a.s.
company.
The drum (or reel) with the wire core is fastened
in the portal pay-oﬀ unit. The wire core is reeled
oﬀ by the pushing caterpillar and goes into the head
of the extrusion machine, where the insulation is de-
posited. In the next step, a new cable core is drawn
through the water-ﬁlled cooling trough. Then it is
dried up by the compressed air, tested for dielec-
tric strength by high voltage and wound up to the
drum. Appropriate tension of the wire core is pro-
vided by the draw caterpillar placed in front of the
portal winding unit. There are also two diameter
monitoring devices and a length measurement device.
As the risk analysis process of the whole line is
very large, we will focus only on the ﬁrst device in the
line – the portal pay-oﬀ unit. We limit our analysis in
order to focus on presenting UML as a risk analysis
support tool. For the same reason, we will not work
out the quantitative part. Our aim is to identify po-
tential hazards that could threaten the smoothness of
the operation and to show possible realisation scenar-
ios. If, as in most cases, we need a quantiﬁcation, we
can make the Risk Priority Number (RPN) [8] cal-
culation used in Failure Mode and Eﬀects Analysis
(FMEA). The results are given by equation (1)
RPN = Sv × Lk ×Dt (1)
where the Sv is a severity value, Lk is a likelihood
value and Dt means detection. All three values are
estimated and assigned during risk analysis, usually
from a predeﬁned degree scale. It is important to re-
member that the degree scale should not begin with
zero, and should have a suitable range.
First, we should start with object identiﬁcation.
There are three major objects that participate in the
unwinding process:
• the portal pay-oﬀ unit,
• the cable reel,
• the operating staﬀ.
Let us focus on the ﬁrst of these. Fig. 2 shows
the design of the portal pay-oﬀ unit. For better un-
derstanding, a cable reel is also drawn in its working
position, but not fastened up. We can clearly see the
structure and the relationships between the compo-
nents. The portal consists of two movable intercon-
nected arms. Each arm has a lifter on its pole, which
is coupled to the other on the opposite side. One
arm is equipped with a compressed-air brake to sup-
ply reel braking. All movements are controlled by
electrical drives. The whole unit traverses on ﬂoor
rails across the unwinding direction. This feature is
necessary for correct unwinding, otherwise the cable
core can be damaged by the reel fronts at the termi-
nal points.
7.1 System description and hazard
identiﬁcation
We can now go ahead, having in mind the steps de-
scribed in section 6. As a ﬁrst step, we should make a
structural description of the system using a class dia-
gram and a behavioural description by a sequence di-
agram. For the purposes of this paper, we can merge
step 1 and step 3 of our former order, so we can
directly compose the identiﬁed hazards into the dia-
gram. Let us make some simpliﬁcations. We presume
minimal failures of the electric drives and the power
supply. Therefore we can consider the three potential
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Fig. 2: Portal pay-oﬀ unit [5] with a cable reel
Fig. 3: Class diagram showing a pay-oﬀ unit with possible hazards
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Fig. 4: Sequence diagram describing preparation for unwinding
mechanical hazards shown in Fig. 3. The class dia-
gram includes standard UML notation [9] with rect-
angles as classes and junction lines as the symbols
for a relationship. The lines can be equipped with
short verbal phrases for better comprehension, and
also with special symbols. These symbols (e.g. di-
amonds) represent the type of relationship and op-
tionally the direction. It is sometimes suitable to
supplement a multiplicity of speciﬁc classes. This in-
dicates a possible count of the same classes in the
relationship. The notation of multiplicity can typ-
ically be expressed in the interval form, e.g. 0..1,
2..5, where the numbers represent lower and upper
bounds.
The important thing is that the diagram repre-
sents classes, not concrete objects. Hence we can
reuse this diagram for other similar devices that are
located in production lines.
The behavioural aspects will be presented as a
preparation for the unreeling process. The sequence
diagram in Fig. 4 describes the sequence of steps that
an operator should take for the correct unreeling pro-
cess. The rectangles with vertical dashed lines at the
top of the picture are called lifelines, and they repre-
sent participant objects in the interaction. The thin
vertical rectangles situated on the dashed lines show
the activity of the speciﬁc object.
7.2 Risk scenarios
In the following step we can create approximate risk
scenarios. They will be presented as Use Case dia-
grams with various focused objects and actors. The
left part of Fig. 5 shows the ﬁrst case, where the cen-
tral part is the pay-oﬀ unit and external objects in the
role of actors can cause possible hazards. The right
side of Fig. 5 shows another situation. The central
investigated object is an operator, and the external
actors are the pay-oﬀ unit and the cable reel, which
can threaten the operator. We can note the same
graphical symbol (an icon of a “stick man” – see the
UML speciﬁcation in [9]) for the human actors and
the technical object actors.
After the approximate scenarios, it is useful to de-
velop a more detailed description of potential hazard
occurrences, including their consequences. We can
use an activity diagram for this purpose. Formally,
activity diagrams arise from Petri Nets, but they dif-
fer in several ways [9]. The common attribute is the
ﬂow of a token. We will show here only the dia-
gram for the ﬁrst scenario. It is drawn in Fig. 6. Let
us note that activity diagrams can, up to a point,
describe actions in terms of their location. This fea-
ture can also be very useful in risk analysis. Another
feature of activity diagrams is their ability to show
concurrent activities and activity branching.
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Fig. 5: The ﬁrst and second scenarios as a Use Case diagram
Fig. 6: The more detailed ﬁrst scenario in an activity diagram
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As was mentioned above, we will not make the last
steps (quantiﬁcation, evaluation and documentation)
of our new method, which lie outside the primary goal
of this paper. We have therefore completed our task.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to present a new ap-
proach to a common interdisciplinary risk analysis
process. Our aim was to present the possibilities of
Uniﬁed Modelling Language as a suitable tool for risk
analysis. We decided that the best way was to show
it on the basis of a small practical example. The
utilisation of UML is very eﬃcient, although the tool
itself comes from a diﬀerent technical branch. Its ab-
stract concept allows the modelling of complex tech-
nical and other issues, e.g. from the ﬁeld of biology.
It is impossible to show in a single paper the whole
range of possibilities of UML, so we tried to empha-
sise signiﬁcant structural and behavioural modelling
considerations. Thanks to the origin of the Uniﬁed
Modelling Language, we can easily use it to convert
the model into further computer processing.
Although the application of UML seems to be
very beneﬁcial, it is also necessary to discuss the
negatives. Obviously we have to learn UML, and
we have to understand it. Sometimes this could be
quite diﬃcult, especially when a risk analysis is made
by a whole team of experts. Another consideration
is the need for a computer system. With the help
of available software tools we can work better with
UML-based risk models. Manipulation, storage and
advanced computation of the models are much easier,
but professional software tools can be very expensive.
We could also draw the diagrams on paper, but in
the case of huge systems this would involve a large
amount of work.
Future work on this topic will involve making po-
tential hazard templates in electro-technical manu-
facturing. These UML-based templates could consist
of particular hazard classes and general risk scenar-
ios, which are typical for this branch of industrial
processing.
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